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ABSTRACT 
 With the 2002 double homicide case of State v. Edwards as their 
backdrop, the Authors discuss Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b) and the 
concept of conditional relevance. Using the example of a letter written by one 
of the victims in the Edwards case, the Authors explain how, although there 
was no evidence that the letter was ever mailed to or read by the defendant, 
the prosecutor correctly argued that the letter should be admitted into 
evidence at the criminal trial. The Authors then provide a history of Rule 
104(b), discuss common applications of the rule, and present a guide for 
practitioners on how to conduct a Rule 104(b) analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How could a prosecutor ever hope to introduce into evidence the 
contents of a letter that no one can testify was ever sent or read? A letter 
that may have been the motive for a double-murder, or could just as 
easily never have been mailed? This quandary is precisely what a 
prosecutor faced several years ago in the murder trial of Mark Edwards. 
Trial attorneys should understand the reasoning behind the trial judge’s 
ruling because they will gain valuable insight into a deceptively 
common evidentiary nuance: conditional relevance. 
State v. Edwards1 was a domestic violence double-homicide trial 
held in Anchorage in August 2002. Edwards was accused of murdering 
his estranged ex-wife and her roommate. The prosecutor offered 
 
 1. State v. Edwards, No. 3AN-S99-1269 Cr. (Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 
2002). 
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evidence that, a few days before the murders, Edwards’ ex-wife wrote a 
letter to Edwards in which she told him that she intended to leave him 
and Alaska forever. 
The prosecutor offered testimony from a woman—a close friend of 
Mark Edwards’ ex-wife—who read the letter just days before the 
murder. This witness testified that Edwards’ ex-wife had written the 
letter and placed it in a stamped envelope, but had not decided whether 
she would mail it. The prosecutor’s theory was that Edwards’ ex-wife 
mailed the letter and that Edwards received it and read it. The 
prosecutor argued that the letter angered Edwards and provided his 
motive for the murders. But the prosecutor faced a daunting obstacle: no 
witness could testify that Edwards’ ex-wife actually mailed the letter or 
that Edwards actually received or read it. 
Given these facts, how could a judge ever admit evidence of the 
letter’s content? What evidence rule governs admissibility? What 
threshold burden must the proponent sustain to trigger admissibility? 
How should the judge rule? What findings must a judge make to protect 
the case from appellate mischief and the specter of reversal? This Article 
discusses the answers to these questions, which are found in the liberal 
threshold for admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence in Alaska 
Rule of Evidence 104(b). 
Seemingly obscure, Evidence Rule 104(b) is seldom cited in Alaska 
street-crime prosecution practice. However, the rule applies to a 
deceptively wide spectrum of evidentiary issues, many of which arise on 
a daily basis in Alaska criminal jury trial practice. As this Article 
explains, Rule 104(b)’s minimal threshold standard—“evidence 
sufficient to support a finding”—applies to disputed prosecution motive 
evidence, disputed Rule 404(b) acts, and a defendant’s disputed 
admissions. Criminal trial attorneys frequently encounter all of these 
situations. 
One would think that criminal practitioners—especially 
prosecutors—would have Rule 104(b) “in their back pocket.” One would 
think that trial judges would be as familiar with Rule 104(b) as they are 
with the law of hearsay exceptions. But, in the Authors’ opinion, this is 
not the case.2 
Part I of this Article discusses the Edwards trial, which provides a 
compelling example of conditional relevance and an application of 
 
 2. When Author James Fayette told a very experienced prosecution 
colleague recently that this Article would focus on Evidence Rule 104(b), the 
colleague quipped, “Evidence Rule 104(b)? Who ever cites to that rule?” Another 
experienced prosecutor said, “Your article will probably be read about half as 
often as the rule is. Do the math . . .” 
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Evidence Rule 104(b). Part II analyzes the doctrine of conditional 
relevance, explains the rule’s relationship to other evidentiary rules, and 
provides a practitioner’s practical, step-by-step guide to using the rule. 
Part III discusses Rule 104(b)’s common trial applications. 
I.  MARK EDWARDS’ TRIAL 
A.  Factual Background3 
In November 1998, Mona Edwards filed for divorce from her 
husband, Mark, a man with a history of substance abuse and violent 
behavior. Mona moved out of the couple’s small house in the Fairview 
area of Anchorage, and moved in with a friend, Maela Crabtree. 
Crabtree’s home was located a few miles away from Fairview in 
Anchorage’s Spenard neighborhood. Mark and Mona saw each other 
periodically in the weeks following the divorce filing. Mark wanted to 
reconcile; Mona did not. 
On December 15, 1998, Mark spoke with Mona in the driveway of 
Maela’s home. They argued after Mona refused to take a walk with 
Mark. Mark pushed Mona down on the driveway, spat at her, raised his 
hand, and extended his thumb and forefinger in an “L” shape. 
Ominously, Mark pointed his index finger at Mona and said “pop!,” as if 
he had pulled the trigger on a gun, and then walked away. 
That evening, Mona drove to the Anchorage courthouse with her 
close friend, Arlene Sanchez, to seek an emergency restraining order 
against Mark. Following a hearing, the order was issued and Mona and 
Arlene returned to Arlene’s house in East Anchorage where they sat and 
talked. As they talked, Mona produced a letter from her pocketbook. 
Arlene later testified that Mona showed her a handwritten letter folded 
inside an unsealed envelope addressed to Mark at his Fairview address.4 
The envelope was stamped. Mona handed Arlene the completed letter 
and asked her to read it. 
 
 3.  Author James Fayette was the Edwards trial prosecutor. Except where 
otherwise indicated, all information contained in the section on Mark Edwards’ 
trial is derived from the Author’s firsthand experience and from the Edwards 
trial transcript (Transcript of Record, State v. Edwards, No. 3AN-S99-1269 Cr. 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2002) (on file with the Alaska Law Review) 
[hereinafter “Trial Transcript”]). 
 4. Other trial evidence established that Mark received mail at the Fairview 
address. When police searched his house after the murders, they photographed 
other delivered mail at his house to prove that he was the resident. But police 
did not look for, or find, Mona’s December 15th letter. 
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Arlene testified that Mona told Mark in the letter that she “hoped 
he would get on with his life and be happy, and to leave her alone, and 
to let her go.” Mona wrote that she was leaving Alaska and returning to 
her family on the East Coast, and that she would stop paying the 
insurance for Mark’s truck at the end of the month—barely two weeks 
away. Arlene testified that Mona closed the letter by telling Mark “she 
wanted [her] gun back.”5 
Arlene and her daughter both advised Mona that she should not 
mail the letter because they were afraid that it would anger Mark. 
Arlene testified that Mona did not say that she had decided to send the 
letter, but Mona did not say that she had decided against sending it, 
either.6 
Three days later, on the evening of Friday, December 18th, Mark 
Edwards drove to Mona and Maela’s home with a .22 caliber, two-shot 
Derringer—the same weapon that witnesses said Mark bought for Mona 
years earlier. When Maela answered the door, Mark forced his way 
inside and shot Maela once in the face, killing her. Mark then locked the 
front door from the inside and walked down to Mona’s basement 
bedroom, where Mona was asleep. Mark shot Mona once in the head, 
killing her. Mark then re-loaded his Derringer and shot himself once in 
the head. The final bullet caused brain damage and severed his optic 
nerve but, incredibly, he survived. 
 
 5. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1716. Other witnesses identified the 
weapon Mona referred to as a two-shot .22 caliber Derringer. Witnesses testified 
that Mark purchased the gun for Mona years earlier. When the couple separated, 
Mona left the gun with Mark. Before the divorce, Mark—unknown to Mona—
loaned the gun to a friend. None of Mona’s statements in the letter, as related by 
Arlene, constituted objectionable hearsay because the prosecution did not offer 
evidence of the letter’s contents for the truth of what Mona wrote. See ALASKA R. 
EVID. 801(c) (hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted). Mona’s writings were only offered to prove the effect of the 
statement on the recipient, Mark. The letter was offered to prove Mark’s motive. 
Mona’s statements were relevant not because they were true, but because they 
were uttered. To the extent that any of the statements could be construed as 
hearsay, they would still have been admissible as statements of Mona’s then-
existing state of mind (Mona’s intent to leave Alaska; her hope that Mark would 
be happy; her intent to stop insurance payments; and her desire to get her gun 
back). See ALASKA R. EVID. 803(3). 
 6. Arlene Sanchez testified, “Well, Mona was always slow with her 
reactions . . . . But she looked at me and she goes ‘do you think[?]’ And I said, 
‘Yes, that I think you shouldn’t mail it’. . . . I do not know positively for sure that 
she mailed it, no. . . . She didn’t—she didn’t acknowledge the fact that I said that 
that’s what I wanted her to do, and she did not tell me that she was not going to 
mail it. She didn’t tell me. She left around 2:00 a.m. in the morning. . . . [w]ith the 
letter . . . . I think my daughter put it back in the envelope. . . . [S]he was the last 
one to read it.” Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1717–18. 
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The next day, friends became alarmed when both Mona and Maela 
failed to make scheduled appointments and did not answer the 
telephone. Friends summoned police, who eventually broke into the 
house and discovered the two women’s bodies. They also found Mark 
Edwards, severely wounded but alive, in the basement near his ex-
wife’s body.7 
In the course of their investigation, the police interviewed 
Edwards’ friend—the man with whom Mark had left Mona’s Derringer. 
This friend testified that Edwards arrived at his house on Thursday 
evening, December 17th, and asked for the Derringer back. The friend 
testified that Edwards did not say why he wanted it, but that he gave 
the gun to Edwards. The prosecution’s theory was that less than twenty-
four hours later Mark Edwards used this very weapon to commit a 
double-murder and attempted suicide. 
At Edwards’ trial, the prosecutor offered Arlene Sanchez’s 
testimony about the contents of Mona’s letter. The prosecutor argued 
that strong circumstantial evidence showed Mona had, in fact, mailed 
the letter. The prosecutor argued that if Mona had mailed the letter on 
Wednesday after she left Arlene’s house at 2:00 a.m., it might well have 
been delivered within one day—sometime on Thursday. If so, according 
to the prosecutor, this would explain why Mark asked his friend to 
return the Derringer that evening and why he used it to kill Mona the 
next day. The defense lawyer objected to the offer as speculative. No one 
saw Mona mail the letter. No one could testify that Mark read it. Why 
was it relevant? The defense lawyer argued, 
[H]ere we have . . . basically [prosecution] conjecture that Mona 
Edwards mailed this letter. . . . [Arlene] does not know whether 
it was mailed or not . . . . The letter was never found at Mark’s 
house. It was never found in his truck. . . . [I]f you are going to 
say [the letter] has any relevance at all you have to show that 
he received it. And that’s just pure conjecture.8 
 
 7. The Edwards prosecution had an extended pre-trial procedural history. 
The case triggered a three-year long series of competency hearings before Judge 
Andrews. Judge Andrews eventually ruled that Edwards was competent to 
stand trial. Edwards’ trial commenced in August 2002. An account of the 
competency aspect of the case is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 8. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1520–21. The prosecutor responded that 
the reason the police never found the letter was obvious—they had not 
interviewed Arlene Sanchez yet, and thus had no reason to look for the letter. 
Additionally, the police did not think that Mark Edwards was going to survive 
his self-inflicted gunshot wound. When the police searched Mark’s house, they 
were primarily interested in locating addresses and telephone numbers for his 
next-of-kin. 
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The prosecutor responded, and characterized the issue as a one of 
conditional relevance, governed by Rule 104(b): 
THE COURT: What is the evidence that is sufficient to [support 
the finding] that it was read, that it was received?. . . . 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: I want my gun back?. . . . That’s huge. I 
want my gun back. Then, . . . within hours . . . for no other 
reason, he’s going to his friend and saying I want that gun back. 
That doesn’t ground a reasonable inference that the gun is 
foremost in his mind[?] . . . [T]he same gun that’s noted in the 
letter that was probably mailed on Wednesday and that he 
could have read on Thursday? That’s a coincidence? A juror 
acting reasonably couldn’t draw that connection? . . . You want 
the gun back? [Then he] kills her with that gun on Friday night 
or Saturday morning? A reasonable juror couldn’t draw the 
connection between those events?9 
At this point, however, Judge Andrews was not convinced. She 
focused on the time required for the letter to be delivered to Edwards: 
I think it’s hopeful that one would’ve gotten the mail that 
[soon] . . . . even the court rule allows three days for mailing.10 
So . . . it would have [had to have caught] the right number of 
postal carts to have made it to his house so soon. I’m not saying 
that it’s not possible, it certainly is possible. But it’s not more 
likely than not that it came so quickly. . . . You’re missing the 
piece for me that the letter could have actually reached there. I 
mean, if you want to bring in someone from the post office 
[who] says that something mailed between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 
a.m. in Anchorage could’ve been delivered . . . in the Thursday 
mail . . . . I’m happy to be educated on the speed of our mail.11 
Judge Andrews sustained the defense objection for the moment, 
but she deferred final ruling until she heard testimony, outside the jury’s 
presence, about Anchorage postal delivery times. Judge Andrews 
allowed the prosecution to call U.S. Postal Service Anchorage 
Administrator Jolene Carter to testify about delivery time for cross-town 
Anchorage mail. Ms. Carter testified that cross-town Anchorage mail is 
delivered within one day “always 95-plus percent” of the time.12 Ms. 
Carter said that her testimony was based upon numerous external 
 
 9. Id. at 1527–28 (emphasis added). 
 10. See ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 40(d) (allowing three additional days to file a 
response when a litigant serves an opponent by mail). 
 11. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1523, 1531–32. 
 12. Id. at 1674. 
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audits and U.S. Post Office quality control surveys with which she was 
very familiar.13 
After Ms. Carter’s credentials were established, the prosecutor 
asked her a hypothetical question: Assume that a properly addressed 
and stamped first class letter was mailed from an East Anchorage post 
box (near Sanchez’ house) early in the day and addressed to a Fairview 
neighborhood location (Edwards’ house). How long would it take for 
the letter to arrive at the recipient’s address? Ms. Carter unequivocally 
responded, “One day.”14 
B.  Analysis of Admissibility of Testimony About the Letter’s 
Content 
With Carter’s testimony, the prosecutor referred Judge Andrews to 
Rule 104(b) and the leading conditional relevance case—Huddleston v. 
United States.15 The prosecution cited Rule 104(b) because the defense 
objection to the admissibility of Mona’s letter was really a relevance 
objection; the defense argued that the prosecution could not 
conclusively establish that the letter was ever mailed, let alone that 
Edwards received and read it. Therefore, the defense argued, testimony 
about the letter’s contents was irrelevant: if Edwards was unaware of 
the letter, it was impossible that the letter was his motive for the 
murders.16 
The prosecutor argued, however, that strong circumstantial 
evidence suggested that the letter actually was mailed, received, and 
read. The letter informed Mark that Mona intended to leave him for 
good, that she would stop paying his car insurance, and that before she 
left, she wanted her gun back. Thus, the letter was clear evidence of 
Mark’s motive to kill his wife with the very gun she had asked him to 
 
 13. When Carter was asked to testify about her qualifications to offer an 
opinion about Anchorage delivery times, she responded, “Well, . . . my job that I 
have, I actually track that. I’m responsible for setting up the staffing and 
scheduling in order to meet the goals and the deadlines of the Anchorage Postal 
Service and meeting the delivery standards.” Id. at 1701–02. 
 14. Id. at 1702. 
 15. 485 U.S. 681 (1988). 
 16. Cf. Byrd v. State, 626 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Alaska 1980) (“[O]ne cannot be 
fearful because of events about which one knows nothing.”); see also Smith v. 
State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993 at *4 n.5 (citing 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 389, at 417 (Chadbourn 1979) (“There is but one 
limitation [on the admission of evidence of a person’s motive] that can be 
thought of as necessary and universal, namely, [that] the circumstance said to 
have excited the [person’s] emotion must be shown to have probably become 
known to the person; because otherwise it could not have affected his 
emotions.”)). 
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return. The prosecutor argued that if the jury believed the letter was 
mailed, received, and read, it could reasonably conclude that the letter 
was evidence of Mark’s motive. 
At Edwards’ trial, Rule 104(b) was the only evidentiary obstacle to 
admission of testimony regarding the content of Mona’s letter. The 
prosecution did not offer Mona’s letter to establish the truth of what 
Mona wrote, so it was not hearsay.17 Mona’s letter, which would be 
strong circumstantial evidence of the perpetrator’s identity, constituted 
powerful motive evidence in the context of a domestic violence 
homicide.18 Therefore, admission of testimony regarding the letter’s 
contents satisfied Evidence Rules 401 and 402.19 Further, Evidence Rule 
403 would not block admission of testimony about Mona’s letter, as 
testimony about the letter was not “unfairly prejudicial” to Mark 
Edwards.20 According to Arlene Sanchez, Mona’s letter did not contain 
the vindictiveness one might expect in a “Dear John” letter. It did not 
contain bitter accusations of any marital or criminal misconduct. 
Testimony about the letter also would not confuse trial issues or 
constitute a distracting waste of time. In fact, Mona’s letter was evidence 
that she still cared for Edwards. That fact might have “prejudiced” Mark 
Edwards in the sense that a juror might conclude that he killed a caring 
woman in cold blood, but that inference is not the sort of “unfair” 
prejudice against which Rule 403 protects. 
Therefore, the issue was framed: Judge Andrews was confronted 
with a classic issue of conditional relevancy. If the letter was mailed, 
received, and read, it was relevant. If not, then it was irrelevant. If Rule 
104(b) was satisfied, the prosecutor’s evidence would be admissible. 
 
 17. See supra note 5. 
 18. Identity was actually contested at Edwards’ trial. The defense argued 
that a sloppy police investigation focused too quickly on Edwards, who had 
been arrested inside a locked house with the bodies of two murdered women. 
The defense lawyers hypothesized that an unknown mystery killer could have 
shot Mona, Maela, and Mark, and then escaped into thin air. The defense lawyer 
argued in summation, “[W]e know there was a fourth person there. . . .” Trial 
Transcript, supra note 3, at 2032. 
 19. See ALASKA R. EVID. 401 (defining relevance; evidence is relevant if it 
makes existence of a disputed fact (e.g., the identity of the perpetrator) more 
probable than it would be without that evidence); ALASKA R. EVID. 402 (“All 
relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by [law]”). 
 20. See ALASKA R. EVID. 403 (stating that relevant evidence may be excluded 
if it is unfairly prejudicial, confuses the issues, or constitutes a waste of time). As 
is often the case with evidence of this sort, the attorneys’ argument over the 
letter, outside the jury’s presence, consumed far more time than the actual trial 
testimony on the point. 
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C.  Judge Andrews’ Ruling 
 In the midst of Edwards’ trial, the prosecutor argued in favor of 
admitting the letter: 
[T]he question is can a reasonable fact finder find by a 
preponderance that the predicate condition has been met; in 
this case—that the letter was sent and received. And as I 
conceded, the State’s proof is circumstantial, but . . . it is 
reasonable to infer that if mailed early on Wednesday, there’s a 
substantial chance . . . that the mail would have been received 
at a residential address, cross-town-mail, on Thursday. And 
then, when one combines that with the other circumstances we 
know, . . . Mr. Edwards, out of the blue, seeking out [his friend] 
on Thursday night to retrieve the gun that’s mentioned in the 
letter, a reasonable . . . juror could find, by a preponderance, . . . 
that the predicate facts have been established by a 
preponderance. . . . 
The prosecutor and the judge then had the following exchange: 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: So, I need not repeat or drone on about 
the circumstances . . . 
THE COURT: No. 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: . . . but . . . she wrote the letter, she 
said . . . 
THE COURT: Got it. Got it. 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: . . . she was going to mail it. 
THE COURT: Got it. Got it. 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: She addressed it, she . . . 
THE COURT: Got it. 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: . . . stamped it, and we’ve got the . . . 
THE COURT: Got it. Got it. 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: . . . occurrences on Thursday night.21 
THE COURT: Got it. Got it. 
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Thank you, Judge.22 
Judge Andrews then ruled: 
[W]hat we have here, and that’s why I’m asking for the 
information from the post office, is the [S]tate’s going to bring 
in testimony to say a letter was written, stamped envelope, 
ready to go. I don’t think the [S]tate needs to prove that it was, 
in fact, mailed. I think there’s circumstantial evidence that the 
 
 21. Mark retrieved the gun from his friend on Thursday night. 
 22. Trial Transcript, supra note 3, at 1686–88. 
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person had the intent to mail it. And then, the question for me 
was, well, is there evidence to show that if the letter was 
mailed, that it could’ve gotten there in the time frame that the 
[S]tate is talking about[?]. . . . And I think that this does make 
that connection. In other words, if she mailed it, it could’ve 
gotten there. . . . [W]ith the testimony from this post office 
person, the answer is, it could’ve gotten there. . . . [S]he 
could’ve mailed it and it could have gotten there. It’s up to the 
jury to decide how much weight to give that. . . . [I]t’s 
admissible.23 
With this ruling, Judge Andrews allowed Jolene Carter to testify 
before the trial jury about the timing of mail delivery in Anchorage. She 
then allowed Arlene Sanchez to testify about the contents of Mona’s 
letter. In summation, the prosecutor argued that when Mona Edwards 
mailed her letter, she essentially signed her own death warrant.24 
II.  ADMISSIBILITY OF CONDITIONALLY RELEVANT EVIDENCE 
ANALYZED: RULE-BY-RULE, STEP-BY-STEP 
A. Commonly Encountered Conditional Relevance Examples 
The issue that Judge Andrews encountered in the Edwards trial may 
seem novel, but conditional relevance is a deceptively common 
evidentiary issue. The issue is encountered almost daily in criminal trial 
practice, though only rarely will busy criminal practitioners and trial 
judges expressly invoke Rule 104(b) or frame an issue using the rule’s 
terms. The following examples provide illustrations of how frequently 
criminal practitioners encounter conditional relevance issues. 
  A prosecutor offers a document and asserts that the 
document is a letter written by the defendant, in which the 
defendant makes damning admissions that he committed 
a crime. The prosecution offers a lay witness who will 
testify that he is familiar with the defendant’s handwriting, 
and, in his opinion, the letter was really written by the 
defendant. The defense attorney objects and explains that 
an expert document examiner will testify that the letter is 
really a forgery.25 
 
 23. Id. at 1691–92. 
 24. Id. at 2002. 
 25. This elegant example of how conditional relevance applies to 
authentication issues is drawn directly from EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, 5 
EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 4.01 (2002). It also resonates with an example cited 
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  In a domestic violence prosecution, the prosecutor offers 
evidence from the battered spouse that the defendant hit 
her on a previous occasion. The defendant objects, arguing 
that the prior episode was never reported to police and did 
not result in a court conviction. “Judge, how do we know 
what really happened on that prior occasion?” 
  In a drug trafficking prosecution, the defendant is charged 
with possession of drugs and paraphernalia that were 
found in his backpack. At arrest, the defendant tells police 
that the backpack belonged to another person. The 
prosecutor offers evidence that the defendant, on a prior 
occasion, was arrested with crack pipes and cocaine 
paraphernalia. The prosecutor argues that the prior 
episode establishes the defendant’s knowledge of what 
street drugs look like and rebuts the defense of innocent, 
unknowing possession. The defense attorney objects, 
arguing that the district attorney dismissed the prior 
criminal charge: “Judge, this is sandbagging. If the DA 
dismissed the charges back then, how are we supposed to 
figure out what really happened now?” 
  In a homicide prosecution, the prosecutor offers evidence 
that the defendant had a motive to kill the decedent. The 
prosecutor offers to prove, circumstantially, that the 
defendant was aware of animosity between the decedent 
and the defendant’s friends. The defense lawyer objects, 
and argues, “Judge, the prosecutor is just wildly 
speculating. How can they hope to establish what my 
client was really thinking?” 
Although not explicitly stated, each of these trial objections is based 
upon conditional relevance principles and is governed by Rule 104(b). 
Under this rule, if the proponent of the evidence can establish that a 
factual issue is “reasonably debatable,” the issue must be submitted to 
the jury.26 The primary signal that an opponent is invoking a conditional 
 
in the Commentary to Alaska’s rule. “[I]f a letter purporting to be from Y is 
relied upon to establish an admission by him, it has no probative value unless Y 
wrote or authorized it.” COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b). 
 26. See Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 336–37 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (equating 
Rule 104(b)’s “evidence sufficient to support a finding” standard with the term 
“reasonably debatable”); see also Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993, at 
*5 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004) (discussing a judge’s “duty” to submit 
reasonably debatable factual issues to the jury). 
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relevance objection is often the opponent’s invocation of the word 
“really.”27 
Thus, the question may be framed as follows: What quantum of 
proof must the proponent marshal to convince the judge to allow the 
jury to hear the evidence on the disputed point? 
B.  Step-by-Step Analysis Under Rule 104(b) 
The relevance of disputed trial evidence will frequently depend on 
the proponent’s “fulfillment” of a preliminary fact,28 which is to say that 
it must be proven to be true. If a preliminary fact is proven, then the 
disputed evidence is probably relevant and should be admitted for the 
jury’s consideration. On the other hand, if a preliminary fact is not 
proven, then the disputed evidence is irrelevant. This situation is the 
reason this concept is described as “conditional” relevance: the 
“condition” is the proponent’s fulfillment of a preliminary fact.29 
An opponent will often point to contradictory evidence, or a benign 
alternative explanation, and argue that the dispute itself renders denial 
of admission of testimony about the event indisputable. But, as the 
commentary to the Alaska Rules of Evidence recognizes, disputed issues 
of fact are the reason the court is holding a jury trial, and disputed facts 
are resolved by juries—not by judges.30 
A leading commentator has described a judge’s role in the 
conditional relevance context as one of “limited screening.”31 A judge 
does not weigh credibility;32 he looks only to a proponent’s evidence, not 
to an opponent’s countervailing evidence.33 In fact, the Alaska Court of 
Appeals has gone a step further and stated that a judge is required to 
view a proponent’s evidence in the light most favorable to the 
proponent.34 The judge is not required to find that a proponent has 
 
 27. The objection will often sound like this: “Judge, how do we know if that 
really happened?” or “How do we know if that (assertion, document, anecdote) 
is really genuine?” 
 28. COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b). 
 29.  See id. 
 30. Id. (“If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy were determined 
solely by the judge . . . the functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would be 
greatly restricted and in some cases virtually destroyed. Relevance questions are 
appropriate questions for juries.”). 
 31. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 25, at § 4.01 (“[T]he judge initially plays a 
limited, screening role, and the jury then makes the final decision on the 
question of fact.”). 
 32. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). 
 33. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 25, at § 4.01. 
 34. See Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Mar. 31, 2004) (holding that when reasonable jurors viewed the evidence at issue 
FAYETTE BUSALACCHI_CPCXNS.DOC 12/11/2009  3:17:07 PM 
184 ALASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 26:2 
actually proven a preliminary fact by a preponderance.35 In fact, there is 
no requirement that the judge actually believe the proponent’s 
evidence.36 A judge merely asks whether a juror, acting reasonably, 
could find the preliminary fact established. If so, the evidence is 
admitted and the matter is submitted to the jury. 
The Alaska Court of Appeals has explained that, where a 
proponent presents evidence “sufficient to support a finding” that a 
preliminary condition is fulfilled, the trial judge has a “duty” under 
Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b) to allow the proponent to offer its 
evidence, so that a jury may decide the ultimate relevance of the 
evidence.37 
Therefore, when disputed preliminary facts seemingly constitute an 
obstacle to admission of trial evidence, the step-by-step conditional 
relevance roadmap is as follows: 
  Without weighing credibility of the sponsoring witnesses, 
the judge must determine if the proponent has offered 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that a preliminary 
fact is established;38 
  The judge must next determine if the disputed evidence is 
logically relevant to a disputed trial issue;39 
  The judge then must determine if admission of the 
disputed evidence is barred by some other evidence rule, 
 
in the light most favorable to the State they could conclude that the evidence 
gave rise to motive). 
 35. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690 (“In determining whether the Government 
has introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither 
weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the 
conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 36. United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
a government witness, who thought that a defendant mouthed the words 
"you’re dead" to her while she was on the stand, was properly allowed to testify 
about the threat even though the trial judge subjectively believed that the 
witness had misinterpreted the defendant’s gesture). The court stated, “There is 
no general rule that a judge must believe evidence to be true prior to allowing 
evidence in. Rule 104(b) applies only to the situation where the relevancy of 
evidence depends on the truth of a fact other than the truth of the evidence 
being introduced. Otherwise, Rule 104(b) would require the trial judge to make 
factual findings regarding every piece of evidence introduced at trial.” Id. 
 37. Smith, 2004 WL 719993, at *5. The court stated that, “[B]ecause the State’s 
evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the necessary condition 
(Smith’s awareness of the conflict) was fulfilled, it was the trial judge’s duty 
under Evidence Rule 104(b) to allow the State to offer its evidence, so that the 
jurors could decide the issue of fact that would determine the ultimate relevance 
of the State’s evidence.” 
 38. See ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b). 
 39. See ALASKA R. EVID. 401; ALASKA R. EVID. 402. 
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such as the rule barring impermissible character 
evidence;40 
  The judge must next determine if admission of the relevant 
evidence is barred by principles of “unfair prejudice” or 
waste of time;41 
  Finally, upon an opponent’s request, a judge should give a 
limiting jury instruction regarding the proper use of the 
evidence, reminding the jury that it is their task to 
determine whether the predicate fact has been proven.42 
This step-by-step approach is consistent with the Alaska cases 
Bennett v. Municipality43 and Ayagarak v. State,44 discussed below. 
C. Rule 104(b) and Huddleston 
Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b) governs preliminary questions of 
relevancy. The rule provides: “When the relevancy of evidence depends 
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, 
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding 
of the fulfillment of the condition.”45 The commentary to this rule 
explains: 
It frequently happens that two or more controverted facts are 
so related that evidence of one is inadmissible without 
evidence of one or more of the others. Thus when a spoken 
statement is relied upon to prove notice to X, it is without 
probative value unless X heard it. Or if a letter purporting to be 
from Y is relied upon to establish an admission by him, it has 
no probative value unless Y wrote or authorized it. Relevance 
in this sense has been labeled “conditional relevancy. . . .” In 
the case of conditional relevance, . . . [t]he judge makes a 
preliminary determination whether the foundation evidence is 
sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of the condition. If 
 
 40. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b). 
 41. See ALASKA R. EVID. 403. 
 42. Wyatt v. State, No. 3607, 1997 WL 250441, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. May 14, 
1997), aff’d, 981 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1999). 
 43. 205 P.3d 1113, 1117 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009). 404(b)(4) evidence must still 
be relevant under Rule 402, and is also subject to Rule 403 exclusion; see also 
Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004) 
(analyzing disputed motive evidence first under Rule 104(b), and finally under 
Rule 403, as discussed below). 
 44. No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623, at *4 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003) 
(outlining analysis under Rule 104(b), then Rule 402, then Rule 403, and finally a 
Rule 105 instruction). 
 45. ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b). 
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so, the item is admitted. If after all the evidence on the issue is 
in, pro and con, the jury could reasonably conclude either that 
fulfillment of the condition is or is not established, the issue is 
for them . . . . If preliminary questions of conditional relevancy 
were determined solely by the judge . . . the functioning of the 
jury as a trier of fact would be greatly restricted and in some 
cases virtually destroyed. Relevance questions are appropriate 
questions for juries.46 
In the Edwards trial, the prosecutor referred Judge Andrews to 
Huddleston v. United States.47 Huddleston was prosecuted for possession 
of a trailer full of stolen videocassettes.48 At trial, there was no question 
that the videocassettes were, in fact, stolen; rather, “the only material 
issue at trial was whether petitioner knew they were stolen.”49 The 
prosecution offered “other acts” evidence under Rule 404(b) to prove 
that Huddleston previously possessed stolen television sets and other 
appliances, thereby establishing Huddleston’s knowledge that the 
videos had been stolen; however, Huddleston was never convicted of 
the prior acts.50 Huddleston testified that he had acquired the television 
sets and other appliances legitimately.51 Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, 
In determining whether the Government has introduced 
sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither 
weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government 
has proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The court simply examines all the evidence in the case and 
decides whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional fact—
 
 46. COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b). The Alaska Supreme Court 
“has [neither] adopted [n]or approved” the Commentary to the Rules of 
Evidence. See COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID., “Introduction.” As the 
Alaska Court of Appeals recently noted, “the commentaries to the various 
evidence rules represent only the views of the Evidence Rules’ main drafter, 
Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg, and not necessarily the views or the intentions 
of our supreme court.” Tsen v. State, 176 P.3d 1, 8 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008). 
However, Alaska courts have long recognized the official commentary as 
persuasive. See, e.g., Spenard Action Comm. v. Lot 3, Block 1, Evergreen 
Subdivision, 902 P.2d 766, 780 (Alaska 1995). 
 47. 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). 
 48. Id. at 682. 
 49. Id. at 683. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. In fact, the Government’s proof to the contrary seemed less than 
compelling. “[T]he government’s only support for the assertion that the 
televisions were stolen was [petitioner’s] failure to produce a bill of sale at trial 
and the fact that the televisions were sold at a low price.” Id. at 682. 
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here, that the televisions were stolen—by a preponderance of the 
evidence.52 
Against this background, it is clear that Judge Andrews’ ruling in 
the Edwards case was correct. Judge Andrews made no finding 
regarding the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. She made no 
finding that Mona’s letter was sent or received. Judge Andrews simply 
concluded that the proponent’s evidence was sufficient to support a 
finding by the jury, by preponderance, that the letter was sent, received, 
read, and provided a motive for Mark Edwards to murder his wife and 
her friend. Having made this finding, she submitted the evidence to the 
jury and allowed them to decide if Mona’s letter triggered the murders 
or not.  
D.  Historical Development of the Rule 
Rule 104(b) embodies a principle that lies at the heart of the modern 
jury system—that our legal system entrusts juries, not judges, with the 
task of deciding disputed facts. Yet the rules of evidence reflect legal 
professionals’ historic distrust of juries. The oft-expressed concern is that 
average citizens, untrained in the law, are too naïve to sift through 
unreliable data or to resist the temptation to decide cases based on 
emotion or equities rather than the law. Thus, modern evidentiary and 
procedural rules exclude entire categories of information from a jury’s 
consideration because legal professionals deem such evidence to be too 
prejudicial, unreliable, or contrary to public policy.53 
This distrust of juries is reflected in the distinction between Rule 
104(a) and Rule 104(b). Under Rule 104(a), judges, not juries, are asked 
to decide legal questions regarding the admissibility of trial evidence. 
Judges decide whether a questioned communication is protected from 
disclosure by privilege, whether someone is competent to be a witness, 
or whether a hearsay exception applies to certain testimony.54 These are 
legal conclusions entrusted to judges. On the other hand, Rule 104(b) 
 
 52. Id. at 690 (emphasis added). 
 53. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a) (character evidence); ALASKA R. EVID. 801 
(hearsay); ALASKA R. EVID. 503–509 (privilege); see also John Leubsdorf, 
Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1209, 1251 (2006) (discussing 
juror distrust in light of modern rules restricting admissibility of hearsay, 
character evidence, existence of insurance coverage, and settlement offers); 
Edward J. Imwinkelreid, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the Character Evidence 
Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, The Doctrine of 
Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 427 (2006) (arguing that jurors might convict 
based upon derogatory character evidence to protect society, rather than upon a 
finding that guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 54. See COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(a). 
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represents the alternate proposition: where admissibility depends on the 
connection of two or more facts, the judge decides only whether a jury 
could reasonably make a rational connection between the facts. 
A detailed history of the drafting, adoption, and promulgation of 
the Alaska Rules of Evidence is beyond the scope of this Article, but a 
brief description may be helpful. Following the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in 1975, then-Chief Justice Rabinowitz invited 
Professor Stephen Saltzburg to draft a proposed evidence code for 
Alaska state courts.55 
In late 1976, Professor Saltzburg submitted a draft of proposed 
evidence rules, which was disseminated for Bar comment. The supreme 
court appointed an evidence rules advisory committee that met during 
1977 and 1978. The advisory committee considered Bar comments, and 
ultimately submitted a proposed evidence code to the Alaska Supreme 
Court, along with commentary drafted by Professor Saltzburg.56 
Although the committee received considerable comment regarding 
some of the proposed rules, Rule 104(b) drew no comment and no 
controversy.57 After making its own revisions, the supreme court voted 
on the proposed evidence rules one by one, and adopted Alaska’s rules 
of evidence. The rules became effective on August 1, 1979.58 
Professor Saltzburg’s commentary to the evidence rules is 
traditionally published in the Alaska Rules of Court handbook,59 and 
appears on the state court website.60 While the commentary has never 
been formally adopted by the Alaska Supreme Court, it is regarded as 
persuasive.61 Professor Saltzburg’s commentary on Rule 104(b) is 
essentially identical to the Advisory Committee Notes for the analogous 
federal evidence rule—citing to the same provisions of the Uniform 
 
 55. Transcript of an address by Prof. Saltzburg to the Alaska Judicial 
Conference, Anchorage, Alaska (Dec. 16–17, 1976) at 2 (on file with the Alaska 
Law Review). 
 56. Report to the Alaska Supreme Court by the Committee on the Rules of 
Evidence (undated) (on file with the Alaska Law Review). 
 57. Alaska Court System Court Rules historical files; Supreme Court Order 
364, documents drawer (available by appointment with the Court System Rules 
Attorney); Alaska Court System, Snowden Administration Building, 820 4th 
Avenue, Anchorage, Alaska. 
 58. Supreme Court Order 364, effective August 1, 1979. 
 59. ALASKA RULES OF COURT HANDBOOK (2009 ed.). 
 60. See ALASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE, available at http://www.state.ak.us/ 
courts/ev.htm. 
 61. COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID., “Introduction”; see also supra note 
46. 
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Rules, sister state evidence codes, and writings by Professor Edmund 
Morgan.62 
Thus, the origins of Alaska’s conditional relevance rule extend far 
beyond the adoption of Alaska’s evidence code in 1979. The modern 
development of the conditional relevance principle dates from an early 
twentieth century case, Gila Valley, Globe & Northern Railway Co. v. Hall. 63 
In that case, a workman was injured while riding along railroad tracks 
in a three-wheeled gasoline car provided by the rail company for his 
transportation as he measured the company’s tracks.64 While taking a 
turn, a wheel from the railcar came loose, causing the plaintiff to be 
thrown from the car onto the tracks, where he was run over.65 He 
suffered serious injuries and sued the railroad for damages, alleging that 
the company was negligent and that the car’s defect could have been 
found through reasonable inspection.66 The trial court found in Hall’s 
favor and the railroad appealed, contending that the court improperly 
refused to admit testimony that indicated the plaintiff may have 
overheard people discussing the wheel’s defective appearance.67 This 
testimony would have been relevant evidence because it would have 
negated the plaintiff’s claim that he had not assumed the risk when 
riding in the car.68 The defendant railroad wanted the testimony 
admitted with the instruction that if the jury believed the plaintiff heard 
the conversation, they could take that fact into consideration when 
deciding whether the plaintiff had assumed the risk.69 
The Supreme Court held against the defendant, stating: 
We agree that the testimony was such as to render it a matter of 
doubtful inference whether Hall heard the conversation; but 
we think this question of fact was one to be determined by the 
trial court, and not by the jury. Questions of the admissibility of 
evidence are for the determination of the court; and this is so 
 
 62. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s notes (citing EDMUND MORGAN, 
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 45–46 (1962) and CAL. EVID. CODE § 403). 
 63. 232 U.S. 94, 100 (1914). The phrase “conditional relevance” never appears 
in the Gila Valley opinion, but most commentators agree that the modern 
development of this rule begins with a discussion of this opinion. See Norman 
M. Garland, An Essay On: Of Judges and Juries Revisited in the Context of Certain 
Preliminary Fact Questions Determining the Admissibility of Evidence Under Federal 
and California Rules of Evidence, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 853, 854 n.8 (2008) (tracing the 
academic authority surrounding the rule’s historical development). 
 64. Gila Valley, 232 U.S. at 97. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 97–98. 
 67. Id. at 102. 
 68. Id. at 100. 
 69. Id. at 101. 
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whether its admission depend[s] upon matter of law or upon 
matter of fact.70 
This facet of the Gila Valley opinion foreshadowed the modern 
distinction between admissibility based upon a disputed legal principle, 
which is now governed by Rule 104(a), and admissibility based upon a 
disputed factual issue, which is governed by Rule 104(b).71 
The principle expressed in the Gila Valley opinion—that a judge, 
not a jury, decides relevance questions regardless of their legal or factual 
basis—did not create uniformity for relevance decisions on this point.72 
In fact, writing fifteen years after Gila Valley, Professor Edmund Morgan 
expressed discomfort with the wildly inconsistent practice in state courts 
on this point.73 
In a seminal article on the topic, Professor Morgan drew a 
distinction between admissibility based on legal principles, which he 
called “competency,” and admissibility based on a disputed fact, which 
we refer to today as conditional relevancy.74 Morgan explained: “In 
theory, then, where the relevancy of A depends upon the existence of B, 
the existence of B should normally be for the jury; where the competency 
of A depends on the existence of B; the existence of B should always be 
for the judge.”75 
 
 70. Id. at 103. 
 71. The commentary to Alaska Rule of Evidence 104(b) includes an example 
that is notably similar to the Gila Valley facts. “[W]hen a spoken statement is 
relied upon to prove notice to X, it is without probative value unless X heard it.” 
COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b). As we have seen, the commentary 
then explains that conditionally relevant facts are to be submitted to the jury. 
The inclusion of this example proves that the drafters clearly rejected the Gila 
Valley result. One might now argue that had Gila Valley been decided in 2009, 
rather than 1914, the outcome would have been completely different. 
 72. Compare Coghlan v. White, 236 Mass. 165, 167–68 (1920) (“It is the 
province of the judge, who presides at the trial, to decide all questions on the 
admissibility of evidence. It is also his province to decide any preliminary 
questions of fact, however intricate, the solution of which may be necessary to 
enable him to determine the other question of admissibility . . . ”) with Hite v. 
Aydlett, 134 S.E. 419, 421 (N.C. 1926) (holding that the jury, rather than the 
judge, could decide if the contract was in writing). For further elaboration on 
this point, see John Maguire & Charles Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in 
Determining the Admissibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1927). 
 73. Edmund Morgan, Functions of the Judge and Jury in the Determination of 
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165, 170 (1929). 
 74. Id. at 171 (noting that the admissibility of a piece of evidence “depend[s] 
on its relevancy”). 
 75. Id. at 169 (emphasis added). 
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The standard that Morgan articulated in 1929 foreshadowed the 
modern distinction between Evidence Rules 104(a) and 104(b).76 Under 
Rule 104(a), a judge rules on the competence of witnesses, the 
application of privilege, the application of hearsay exceptions, the 
existence of co-conspirator statements, the exclusion of involuntary 
statements, and the sufficiency of a Miranda warning.77 Thus, Rule 
104(a) governs the court’s resolution of disputed legal issues. Rule 
104(b), however, governs factual controversies. Under Rule 104(b), the 
judge submits the evidence to the jury when there is a factual dispute 
that could be resolved in either party’s favor. In other words, if the 
relevance of proffered evidence depends on a disputed factual issue, the 
judge merely determines whether the issue is “reasonably debatable.”78 
If it is, the judge submits the matter to the jury for its decision.79 
Professor Morgan also addressed the practical reasons why judges, 
not juries, should make preliminary legal rulings; his arguments are 
now the rationale for Rule 104(a). Writing almost forty-five years before 
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Morgan explained 
that it did not make sense to leave a ruling on a legal principle to the 
jury.80 Morgan noted that “[i]t will not do to disregard realities,”81 and 
he observed that even if a jury of lay people was competent to rule on 
legal questions regarding admissibility, it is a near impossibility that the 
jury members would be able to erase evidence from their minds should 
they conclude it was legally inadmissible.82 
 
 76. See, e.g., IMWINKELREID, supra note 25, § 2.05(1); 1 HERBERT J. STERN & 
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, TRYING CASES TO WIN: EVIDENCE: WEAPONS FOR WINNING 
491–528 (2000) (contrasting and explaining Rules 104(a) and 104(b)). 
 77. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). 
 78. Edmund Morgan, supra note 73, at 170 (“The judge does not require the 
plaintiff, as a condition to its reception, to prove to him [the conditioning fact]. It 
is sufficient for plaintiff to present evidence from which the jury might 
reasonably so find.”). 
 79. Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 338 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (describing the 
Rule 104(b) test as one of reasonable debate). 
 80. Edmund Morgan, supra note 73, at 170 (holding that if ruling regarding 
application of privilege were left to juries, “[i]n many instances . . . the chief 
objective of the exclusionary rule would be destroyed. Where the exclusion is 
based on a policy of protection of an interest, nothing could be more absurd than 
to violate the interest and then to instruct the jury to repair the damage by 
disregarding the wrongfully extracted evidence. If a lawyer is compelled to 
repeat in open court the confidential communications of his alleged client, and 
the jury is told to disregard them in case they find the relationship exists, the 
harm of disclosure is beyond remedy.”). 
 81. Id. at 168 (noting that because the jury already faces such obstacles as 
“vile ventilation, inadequate acoustics and limited light,” they should not be 
imposed with additional burdens). 
 82. Id. at 168–69 (“[T]o expect the unskilled minds of jurors to do so is little 
short of ridiculous.”). 
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In contrast, Morgan provided a variety of examples of what would 
come to be known as conditional relevance, noting that when 
admissibility turns on the determination of a particular fact, the decision 
must be for the jury and not the judge.83 Morgan seemed particularly 
troubled by the judge’s power to take away crucial fact-finding 
functions from the jury.84 
III.  COMMON TRIAL APPLICATIONS 
In the past twenty years, the Alaska Court of Appeals has relied on 
conditional relevance principles several times to affirm admission of 
evidence regarding proof of a defendant’s admissions, his commission 
of Rule 404(b) prior acts, and his awareness of facts giving rise to the 
motive to commit the crime. The following section examines some of 
these cases. 
A.  Disputed Motive Evidence 
In the Edwards trial, the prosecutor offered Mona Edwards’ letter 
because it was powerful motive evidence. Such disputed motive 
evidence is conceptually identical to a case decided by the court of 
appeals two years after the Edwards trial. In Smith v. State,85 the 
defendant was charged with murder stemming from the execution-style 
shooting of an unarmed man named William Hall.86 Smith shot Hall 
several times at point-blank range and ran away.87 Fortunately, a police 
officer was nearby and responded to citizens’ 911 calls within seconds.88 
The officer tracked Smith through the snow, following the only set of 
footprints leading away from the murder scene.89 The officer found 
Smith in the woods several hundred yards from the murder scene, 
 
 83. Id. at 170. 
 84. Id. at 170–72 (“If the judge can determine such a matter, then by clever 
manipulation he can remove almost any material issue from the field of the 
jury.”). 
 85. Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 31, 
2004). Author James Fayette was the Smith trial prosecutor. This Article 
examines many unreported Alaska appellate opinions. The Alaska Court of 
Appeals has held that litigants may cite unpublished opinions for “whatever 
persuasive power” the opinion may hold, but not as binding precedent. McCoy 
v. State, 80 P.3d 757, 764 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (interpreting ALASKA R. APP. P. 
214). 
 86. Smith, 2004 WL 719993, at *1. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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sitting on his jacket, changing his clothes, literally sitting on the murder 
weapon.90 
Despite the strength of the physical evidence linking Smith to 
Hall’s murder, the prosecution also sought to prove that Smith had a 
motive for the crime, since the two men appeared to be strangers.91 The 
prosecution offered to prove that Smith was aware of Hall’s pending 
divorce proceedings and that Hall had an antagonistic relationship with 
two of Smith’s friends as a result of the divorce, arguing that this 
knowledge could have provided him with a motive to kill Hall.92 Judge 
Mannheimer explained: 
Thus, the State’s evidence of motive was conditionally relevant: 
it was relevant if the jurors inferred, from the circumstances, 
that Smith was aware of the conflict between his friends and 
William Hall. Of course, this inference was not ineluctable. But 
the inference was a reasonable one—that is, reasonable jurors 
(viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State) 
could conclude that Smith was aware of the circumstance 
(Fleury’s and Pamela Hall’s conflict with William Hall) that 
might engender the motive proposed by the State. . . . Because 
the State’s evidence was conditionally relevant, and because 
the State’s evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the 
necessary condition (Smith’s awareness of the conflict) was 
fulfilled, it was the trial judge’s duty under Evidence Rule 
104(b) to allow the State to offer its evidence, so that the jurors 
could decide the issue of fact that would determine the 
ultimate relevance of the State’s evidence: the issue of whether 
Smith was aware of the proposed motivating circumstance—
the conflict between his friends and William Hall.93 
Therefore, the Smith court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling that the 
motive evidence was admissible, despite the fact that there was no direct 
proof that the Hall divorce played a role in Smith’s motive.94 
The Smith holding is consistent with McCormack v. State,95 where 
the court of appeals once again held that that admissibility of Rule 
404(b) motive evidence is governed by the same Rule 104(b) principle.96 
The McCormack court affirmed admission of evidence that McCormack 
committed two uncharged robberies during a crime spree to prove his 
 
 90. Id. at *1–2. 
 91. Id. at *4. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at *5. 
 94. Id. at *4–6. 
 95. No. A-9870, 2008 WL 5352364 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2008). 
 96. Id. at *3–4. 
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motive to commit a third robbery.97 The prosecution argued that 
McCormack committed the robberies because of serious financial 
difficulties.98 The court of appeals specifically rejected the defense’s 
claim that the trial judge should have been required to find, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that “the defendant actually committed” the 
uncharged crimes.99 Rather, the court agreed that the prosecution had 
offered sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that McCormack 
had committed the uncharged offenses and that the trial judge properly 
submitted the issue to the jury for its evaluation.100 
B.  Disputed Statement of Defendant 
The court of appeals applied the same Rule 104(b) standard in 
Marino v. State.101 Marino was charged with murder and attempted 
murder.102 At trial, the prosecution called a witness to testify that, 
shortly before the murder, Marino boasted that he knew “what it felt 
like to kill someone,” that “killing was a ‘rush’ like taking drugs,” that it 
was “entertaining to watch someone begging for their life,” and that 
when he said this, Marino laughed.103 Marino disputed that he made the 
statements.104 He also claimed that if he made the statements, it was not 
near the time of the charged murder.105 On cross-examination, the 
witness equivocated about whether Marino actually made the statement 
on the day of the murder or a few days earlier.106 Yet, the trial court 
admitted the statement, and the court of appeals affirmed, relying upon 
Rule 104(b).107 Judge Mannheimer concluded that because a reasonable 
juror could find that Marino made the statement, the statement was 
admissible, and the defense was free to argue its credibility before the 
jury.108 
 
 97. Id. at *3. 
 98. Id. at *2. 
 99. Id. at *3. The 2008 McCormack court was presented with the issue as one 
of plain error and waiver, because this argument was not squarely presented to 
the trial judge. Id. However, the court approvingly cited and relied upon its 2003 
Ayagarak opinion, infra note 113, reaffirming that opinion’s validity. McCormack, 
2008 WL 5352364, at *3. 
 100. McCormack, 2008 WL 5352364, at *3. 
 101. 934 P.2d 1321, 1329–30 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
 102. Id. at 1324. 
 103. Id. at 1325. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1329. 
 107. Id. at 1330. 
 108. Id. 
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The converse of this principle also applies. In Alaska, a suspect’s 
silence in the face of an accusation may sometimes be admissible as an 
“adoptive admission.” In Bloomstrand v. State,109 the court held that 
although a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant’s post-arrest 
silence, he may offer proof of the defendant’s pre-arrest silence in the 
face of an accusatory question.110 Such evidence often treads 
dangerously close to impermissible comment on the defendant’s right to 
silence.111 What if the defendant objects to a prosecution offer of 
adoptive admission testimony and claims he was aware of his Miranda 
rights and was exercising them? No Alaska case addresses the point, but 
federal authority holds that the prosecution must prove the absence of 
Miranda warnings under Rule 104(b) when offering testimony about the 
defendant’s silence.112 
C. Other Relevant Acts and Prior Crimes: Rule 404(b) 
1.  Prior Domestic Violence Offenses 
In Ayagarak v. State,113 the defendant was accused of assaulting his 
wife.114 He defended himself at trial by claiming self-defense.115 In 
response, the prosecution offered evidence that Ayagarak had assaulted 
his wife on three prior occasions.116 Only one of the prior assaults had 
resulted in a conviction.117 Of the two instances that did not result in a 
conviction, Ayagarak claimed that in one he acted in self-defense, and 
he denied the other event altogether.118 Yet, the court of appeals 
affirmed the admission of the wife’s testimony about all three prior 
 
 109.  656 P.2d 584 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982). 
 110. Id. at 588 (holding that a murder defendant’s pre-trial failure to answer 
employer’s question about why he did not call the police was admissible as an 
adoptive admission by silence); see also Doisher v. State, 658 P.2d 119, 120 
(Alaska 1983) (holding that an accused’s failure to speak in response to an 
accusatory comment is admissible as an adoptive admission where “an innocent 
man would in the situation and surrounding circumstances naturally respond”). 
 111. See Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1177 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) 
(quoting People v. Conyers, 420 N.E.2d 933, 935 (N.Y. 1981) (“[T]he individual’s 
silence in such circumstances may simply be attributable to his awareness that 
he is under no obligation to speak or to the natural caution that arises from his 
knowledge that anything he says might later be used against him at trial.”)). 
 112. United States v. Cummiskey, 728 F.2d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(establishing that when offering evidence of silence, “it is the prosecutor’s 
burden, under Rule 104(b), to establish that Miranda warnings were not given 
prior to the silence relied upon for impeachment purposes”). 
 113. No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003). 
 114. Id. at *1. 
 115. Id. at *2. 
 116. Id. at *1. 
 117. Id. at *1–2. 
 118. Id. 
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assaults.119 The court held that the minimal Rule 104(b) “conditional 
relevance” threshold governs the admissibility of prior bad acts.120 The 
Ayagarak court determined that a reasonable juror could have believed 
the victim and could thus conclude that Ayagarak had committed all of 
the prior assaults.121 The Ayagarak court noted that where the relevance 
of the prior-event testimony depends on a credibility assessment, such 
an assessment is properly in the province of the jurors, not the judge.122 
“Evidence Rule 104(b) normally leaves the resolution of a predicate fact 
to the jury—particularly when resolution of that disputed fact hinges on 
credibility.”123 The Ayagarak court specifically rejected a claim that the 
judge must determine that the prior event be proven by “clear and 
convincing” evidence as a predicate for admissibility.124 
Very recently, the court of appeals faced a similar issue in Bennett v. 
Municipality.125 Bennett was convicted of assaulting his wife.126 On 
appeal, he contended that the court erred by admitting testimony about 
his prior assault of his wife under Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b)(4).127 
Bennett argued that this prior incident should not have been admitted as 
a “crime of domestic violence” because he did not “assault” his wife on 
the prior occasion, but rather injured her in self-defense.128 Judge Coats 
reasoned that the prosecutor had sustained her Rule 104(b) burden, even 
with the victim’s testimony standing alone: 
In this case, the Municipality offered sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable juror to conclude that the 2005 incident was an act 
of domestic violence: Celeste Bennett testified that, after she 
insulted Steven during an argument, he knocked her to the 
ground, hit her repeatedly on the side of her face and choked 
her, leaving her with two black eyes, bruises on her neck, and 
broken blood capillaries in her right eye. Once the court made 
the preliminary finding of sufficient evidence required by 
Evidence Rule 104(b), the strength of the Municipality’s 
evidence of the prior act was just one factor for Judge 
Swiderski to consider in balancing the probative value of the 
 
 119. Id. at *2. 
 120. Id. at *5. 
 121. Id. at *2. 
 122. Id. at *5. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at *6. In the domestic violence context, the Ninth Circuit reached the 
same conclusion in an opinion issued nine years before Ayagarak. United States 
v. Hinton, 31 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 125. 205 P.3d 1113 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009). 
 126. Id. at 1114. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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evidence against the risk that Bennett would be unfairly 
prejudiced. Judge Swiderski determined that the evidence 
should not be excluded under Evidence Rule 403; it then 
became the jury’s duty to evaluate the credibility of the 
Bennetts’ conflicting testimony on this incident, and to decide 
what weight, if any, to give the evidence in assessing Bennett’s 
guilt of the charged assault.129 
In Bennett, we encounter a classic application of Rule 104(b) and the 
judge’s limited gate-keeping role. Because admissibility of Bennett’s 
prior assaultive act hinged on a credibility determination (whether the 
jury believed Bennett or his wife), the judge’s proper role was simply to 
inquire whether a juror, acting reasonably, could find that Bennett had 
committed the prior assault. The judge was not required to rule that the 
prior assault had actually occurred,130 to find the prior event proven by 
“clear and convincing evidence,”131 or to weigh the credibility of 
witnesses.132 Rather, under Smith v. State, the judge was required to view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent.133 In other 
words, the judge could not properly refuse to admit the evidence 
because he did not personally believe that Bennett had acted in self-
defense on the prior occasion. Such a decision would have been an 
improper invasion on the role of the jury and on the prosecution’s right 
to have the jury resolve disputed facts.134 
2.  Drug Crimes 
Criminal law practitioners routinely confront conditional relevance 
issues in street drug prosecutions. A defendant will often admit that he 
was present at a location where police seized drugs and contraband but 
claim that he was unaware that drugs were present. In such cases, 
 
 129. Id. at 1117–18 (citation omitted). 
 130. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988) (“[T]he trial 
court neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has 
proved the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence. The court 
simply examines all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could 
reasonably find the conditional fact.”). 
 131. See Ayagarak v. State, No. A-8066, 2003 WL 1922623 at *6 (Alaska Ct. 
App. Apr. 23, 2003). 
 132. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690 (“In determining whether the Government 
has introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court neither 
weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the Government has proved the 
conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 133. See Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Mar. 31, 2004). 
 134. See ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s notes (“If preliminary 
questions of conditional relevancy were determined solely by the judge . . . the 
functioning of the jury as a trier of fact would be greatly restricted and in some 
cases virtually destroyed.”). 
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prosecutors will typically offer evidence of the defendant’s prior drug 
crimes to establish the defendant’s knowledge about what drugs look 
like and how they are packaged, to demonstrate absence of mistake or 
accident.135 But what if those prior drug crimes have not resulted in 
convictions? The court of appeals has relied on Rule 104(b) to reach the 
same result as the Ayagarak and Bennett courts. 
In Goan v. State,136 the defendant was charged with selling LSD to 
an undercover informant.137 The trial judge admitted evidence that the 
informant had bought LSD on three prior uncharged occasions, in the 
weeks before the charged sale.138 The informant could not testify that 
Goan had directly participated in the prior sales.139 The trial judge, 
however, admitted the testimony because the circumstances of the prior 
sales were similar.140 Judge Coats explained: 
In determining whether the state has introduced sufficient 
evidence to satisfy Rule 104(b), the court examines all the 
evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could 
reasonably find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The trial court neither weighs credibility nor makes a 
finding that the state has proved the conditional fact. . . . 
Considering all the evidence, a question of fact was created as 
to whether [the undercover police officer] had dealt with Goan 
in the previous transactions. A reasonable juror could infer 
from the evidence that there was a consistent pattern in the 
four transactions. Given the similarity of the details, a juror 
could conclude that the details of who was involved and where 
they did business were also the same. Therefore, Judge Savell 
acted within his discretion in allowing the evidence of the three 
prior sales to go to the jury for factual determination.141 
 
 135. See ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1); see also Cunningham v. State, Nos. A-6717, 
4090, 1999 WL 602980 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1999); Valcarcel v. State, No. A-
6741, 1999 WL 296286 (Alaska Ct. App. May 12, 1999); Backus v. State, No. A-
5904, 1997 WL 216823 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1997) (all affirming admission of 
evidence of prior drug offenses to establish knowledge and absence of mistake 
or accident); Clark v. State, 704 P.2d 799, 806 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (affirming 
admission of defendant’s possession of a set of weighing scales to prove intent to 
sell marijuana). 
 136.  No. A-2908, 1989 WL 1597111 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1989). 
 137. Id. at *1–3 (citing Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690). 
 138.  See id. at *4. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at *5. 
 141. Id. 
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3. Spoliation: Witness Threats, Intimidation and Cover-up Behavior 
Alaska law holds that spoliation conduct—a defendant’s threats to 
witnesses, attempts to bribe police officers or witnesses, and attempts at 
evidence tampering—are admissible to prove a defendant’s 
consciousness of guilt.142 This is true even where the questioned conduct 
is committed by third parties.143 In street crime prosecution, third-party 
attempts to silence or intimidate adverse witnesses are not uncommon. 
What standard of proof must the proponent sustain to trigger 
admissibility of the third-party conduct? No Alaska case squarely 
answers the question.144 But, the defendant’s connection to the 
intimidation attempt—just as his awareness of facts that give rise to his 
motive—is a disputed factual issue. If the defendant authorized or 
encouraged the intimidation, the evidence is relevant to show his 
consciousness of guilt. Therefore, the issue raises a disputed factual 
issue, and a judge should analyze the point under Rule 104(b). 
D. Authentication 
Criminal trial practitioners frequently confront evidentiary 
disputes regarding authentication issues. Yet, practitioners very rarely 
frame debates regarding authentication of photographs or audio 
recordings in conditional relevance terms. But, in fact, the concepts are 
very closely intertwined. Consider these examples: 
  Narcotics detectives record an informant’s telephone 
conversation with a man setting up a cocaine deal. Police 
later arrest a man they believe to be the seller and whose 
voice they believe they can identify on the tape. The 
 
 142. See, e.g., Garrett v. State, No. A-6266, 1997 WL 1865, *5 (Alaska Ct. App. 
Jan. 2, 1997) (“Evidence that Garrett offered to give Officer Stevenson something 
if the officer let him go home is admissible to show Garrett’s consciousness that 
he was intoxicated and that he was driving with a suspended license.”). 
 143. Stumpf v. State, 749 P.2d 880, 898–99 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (“Evidence 
that a third party attempted to intimidate a witness is admissible against a 
defendant as manifesting a consciousness of guilt. The state, however, must first 
establish that the defendant authorized the actions. The defendant’s connection 
to the threats may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence.”); see also 
Wortham v. State, 617 P.2d 510, 512 (Alaska 1980) (quoting Saunders v. State, 346 
A.2d 448, 450–51 (Md. Ct. App. 1975) (“[T]he authorization by the accused may 
be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and an inference may be 
sufficient to connect the accused.”)). 
 144. Federal authority does provide an answer. In United States v. Maddox, 
944 F.2d 1223, 1226 (6th Cir. 1991), a government witness testified that the 
defendant threatened her during a trial recess. The defendant denied it, and 
testimony from the court security officer was ambiguous. Id. The Sixth Circuit 
held that the issue was governed by Rule 104(b). Id. at 1229–30. 
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defendant denies that he is the speaker and argues that he 
has a brother whose voice sounds like his. 
  Police seize a photograph of a man engaged in a sexual act 
with a young person from the man’s computer. Police 
assert that the photograph depicts the computer owner 
having sex with a minor, and they arrest the man. Police 
assert that they can identify the man but are unable to 
identify the young person. Police maintain that they are 
able to establish the location of the photograph 
circumstantially and the age of the second person by close 
examination of the computer’s electronic data and careful 
review of the room depicted in the photograph itself. The 
defendant makes no admissions regarding whether he is 
the person depicted in the photograph, whether the other 
person is a child, or the location of the photograph. 
How does a judge resolve these authentication problems? Alaska 
Rule of Evidence 901 governs authentication, and states, “The 
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent 
to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding 
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”145 Thus, Rule 
901 uses the same rubric as Rule 104(b): the standard of “evidence 
sufficient to support a finding.”146 In fact, the Alaska Rule’s commentary 
expressly links Rule 901 with Rule 104(b), noting that “[t]his 
requirement of showing authenticity or identity falls in the category of 
relevancy dependent upon fulfillment of a condition of fact and is 
governed by the procedure set forth in Rule 104(b).”147 
Under Rule 104(b), the order of proof is left to the discretion of the 
trial judge.148 The proponent “need only make a prima facie showing of 
authenticity, as ‘the rule requires only that the court admit evidence if 
sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could 
find in favor of authenticity or identification.’”149 After the evidence has 
 
 145. ALASKA R. EVID. 901. 
 146. ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b). 
 147. See ALASKA R. EVID. 901 (citing FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s 
notes). The advisory committee’s notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 901 draw the 
same link to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b). See, e.g., United States v. Black, 767 
F.2d 1334, 1342 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 148. FED. R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s notes. 
 149. United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1342 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 5 J. 
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE para. 901(a)(01), at 901-16 to 901-
17 (1983)); see also Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1411 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(disapproving a judge’s ruling excluding a tape recording where the judge did 
not believe that the recorded voice was the defendant’s). “The district court’s 
determination that it ‘was not satisfied that the voice on the tape was that of 
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been admitted, “[t]he credibility or probative force of the evidence 
offered is, ultimately, an issue for the jury.”150 
Alaska courts have consistently applied this principle. In Dillard v. 
Municipality of Anchorage,151 a defendant objected to admission of a 
recording of his arrest made by a police officer with a pocket recorder. 152 
The defendant argued that the tape was garbled and claimed that it was 
difficult to determine whose voices were actually captured on the 
tape.153 The court of appeals ruled that the issue was governed by Rule 
104(b), and therefore, as long as the judge found that the jury had a 
“reasoned basis” to conclude that the defendant’s voice was on the tape, 
“this issue was for the jury to decide.”154 
The court of appeals reached the same result four years later in 
Wyatt v. State.155 Wyatt was tried for killing his wife.156 The prosecutor 
offered testimony from a crisis center worker, who testified that the day 
before the victim disappeared, she had received a call from a woman 
who identified herself as “Diane Wyatt,” asked about divorce, and said 
that “there was a possible lethal situation when she told her husband 
about [the divorce].”157 The defense argued that the evidence 
establishing the identity of the caller as Wyatt’s wife was insufficient.158 
The court of appeals held that the judge properly submitted the issue to 
the jury, even in the face of the factual dispute.159 The Wyatt court noted 
that the judge gave a proper limiting instruction and told the jury to 
consider the testimony about the call “if you find that she made the 
statement.”160 
 
Davis,’ is inconsistent with [Rule 104(b)] principles. So long as a jury is entitled 
to reach a contrary conclusion, it must be given the opportunity to do so.” Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 150. Black, 767 F.2d at 1342. 
 151.  No. A-4496, 1993 WL 13156859 (Alaska Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1993). 
 152. Id. at *4–5. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. (citing ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b) advisory committee’s notes); see also 
James v. State, 671 P.2d 885, 893 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 
698 P.2d 1161 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (reaching the same result without referring 
to Rule 104(b); affirms the admissibility of a recording of a 911 call despite the 
fact that the identity of the caller was disputed). 
 155. No. 3607, 1997 WL 250441 (Alaska Ct. App. May 14, 1997), aff’d, 981 P.2d 
109 (Alaska 1999). 
 156. Id. at *1. 
 157. Id. at *3. 
 158. Id. at *4 n.2. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id; see also Hough v. State, No. A-6359, 1998 WL 253998, at *5–6 (Alaska 
Ct. App. May 20, 1998). In Hough, there was an issue regarding admission of 
testimony about a telephone call in which defendant admitted to a shooting. Id. 
at *5. The speaker’s identity was supported by the context of the conversation, 
nicknames used, sound of the speaker’s voice, the witness’s familiarity with the 
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Most recently, in Thompson v. State,161 Thompson was charged with 
sexual abuse of a minor for having sex with a thirteen-year-old girl.162 
During the investigation, police obtained a Glass warrant that 
authorized surreptitious recording of telephone conversations between 
Thompson and the girl’s mother.163 The investigating officers left the 
recording equipment with the mother.164 She then recorded two 
conversations in which Thompson admitted to both knowing the girl 
was thirteen years old and to having sex with her.165 No law 
enforcement officer was present when the calls were recorded.166 Before 
trial, the defense objected to the admission of the tapes, arguing that no 
law enforcement officer could authenticate the tapes or testify about the 
precise date that the conversations occurred.167 
The court of appeals held that Rules 901 and 104(b) governed the 
issue, stating: “[t]hus, the modern test for authentication ‘is . . . 
[whether] the proponent [of the evidence has] presented sufficient 
evidence to support a rational finding [that] the tape recording is 
authentic.’”168 The court held that evidence questioning the authenticity 
of a recording may be introduced to attack the credibility of the 
recording, but does not bar its admission into evidence.169 
The Thompson court also noted that Rules 901 and 104(b) govern the 
threshold standard for admission of a photograph.170 In fact, the court of 
appeals had reached the same conclusion twenty years earlier. In Bell v. 
 
defendant, and the witness’s opinion that defendant was the caller. The court 
held that admissibility was governed by Rules 104(b) and 901. Id. (citing United 
States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating “once ‘any basis for 
identifying the voice’ has been shown, questions of weight and credibility are for 
the jury”)); see also State v. Danielson, 681 P.2d 260, 261 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding the identification requirement is “met if sufficient proof is introduced 
to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of identification”)). 
 161.  210 P.3d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009). 
 162. Id. at 1233. 
 163. Id. at 1234; see also id. at 1234 n.2 (citing State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 
(Alaska 1978) (holding that under the Alaska Constitution, the police “must 
obtain a warrant before electronically monitoring or recording a private 
conversation,” even if one of the participants has consented to the surveillance)). 
 164. Id. at 1234. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1234–35. 
 168. Id. at 1238–39 (citing EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED & DANIEL D. BLINKA, 
CRIMINAL EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 134 (2d ed. 2007)). For a helpful discussion 
of the interplay between Rules 104(b) and 901 in the context of questioned 
surveillance audio and videotapes, see United States v. Stephens, 202 F.Supp. 2d 
1361, 1367–68 (N.D. Ga. 2002). 
 169. Thompson, 210 P.3d at 1239. 
 170. Id. 
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State,171 the victim equivocated about whether her injuries, which were 
depicted in police photographs, were actually caused by the 
defendant.172 At trial, the victim testified that she was uncertain about 
the cause of the injuries.173 On voir dire, the victim stated that she 
thought the injuries were probably “from running into tables and stuff” 
while she was intoxicated.174 She was impeached with her own prior 
testimony, where she had attributed the injuries to Bell.175 Judge 
Singleton wrote: 
Bell argues . . . that the court, not the jury, must determine the 
relevance of evidence sought to be admitted at trial [under 
Alaska Rules of Evidence 104(a) and (b)]. In Bell’s view, Judge 
White erroneously ruled that the question of relevance was to 
be determined by the jury. Second, Bell argues that there was 
an inadequate foundation for the admission of the photographs 
because Grant could not positively identify the origins of her 
injuries. Alaska Rule of Evidence 901 requires the 
authentication and identification of an exhibit as a condition 
precedent to its admissibility. We find no error. First of all, we 
are of the view that Judge White was simply applying [Alaska 
Rule of Evidence] 104(b) in admitting the photographs. In 
essence, he was leaving it up to the jury not to determine a 
legal question, but rather to determine whether the 
photographs, in fact, depicted injuries inflicted on Grant by 
Bell. The ultimate relevance of the exhibits depended upon this 
factual determination which was properly left to the jury. 
Secondly, we are satisfied that there was sufficient 
authentication and identification of the photographs. As we 
noted in our earlier opinion, Grant sought medical attention 
after each separate beating, and reported both offenses to the 
police. In each case, she was examined by a treating physician 
and interviewed by an investigating officer. In this case, the 
photographs were properly authenticated by the investigating 
officer and the attending physician. Under the circumstances, it 
was a factual question as to whether the photographs 
accurately depicted injuries inflicted upon Grant by Bell.176 
 
 171.  No. A-1873, 1988 WL 1513110 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1988) 
 172. Id at *2–3. 
 173. Id. at *2. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at *3 (citation omitted). 
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The Bell court squarely rejected a defense claim that resolution of 
disputed facts was a role for the judge.177 Instead, it specifically held that 
the relevance of the photographs was an issue for the jury, not the 
judge.178 It also implicitly held that conditional relevance could be 
satisfied by foundational evidence contained in a prior inconsistent 
statement.179 
E.  Defense Applications 
As we have seen, the Rule 104(b) “reasonably debatable” standard 
governs admissibility where relevance depends on a disputed factual 
issue. This Article focuses on challenges to prosecution evidence; yet, the 
rule is party-neutral. Theoretically, Rule 104(b)’s proponent-friendly, 
liberal admissibility threshold applies regardless of the proponent’s 
identity. In other words, the rule is no different for the defense lawyer 
than it is for the prosecutor. 
In criminal cases, however, the prosecutor bears the burden of 
proof and thus presents his evidence first. Appellate challenges are most 
commonly mounted by criminal defendants to admission of the 
prosecution’s evidence, and rarely the other way around.180 
Accordingly, in the preceding sections, we have seen illustrative 
examples of Alaska courts applying Rule 104(b) to the prosecutor’s 
conditionally relevant evidence. Can defense attorneys employ the same 
evidentiary principle to secure admission of defense evidence? 
1.  Self-defense; Awareness of Opponent’s Prior, Specific Violent Acts 
What if the defendant in an assault prosecution claims that he was 
aware of a prior, specific, violent act committed by the victim? 
Furthermore, what if the defendant asserts that knowledge caused him 
to be afraid of the victim, providing support for his claim that he acted 
reasonably in self-defense? Alaska law has long held that the evidence of 
prior specific violent conduct of which the defendant is subjectively 
aware is admissible in support of a self-defense claim.181 But what if the 
 
 177. Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179. Id. In Alaska, a prior inconsistent statement may be considered for its 
substantive truth, not merely for its impeachment value. See State v. Batts, 195 
P.3d 144, 158 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008) (citing Beavers v. State, 492 P.2d 88, 94 
(Alaska 1971)); see also COMMENTARY TO THE ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) 
(drawing a contrast to the federal rule)). 
 180. For a rare example of a prosecution appeal of disputed conditionally 
relevant defense evidence, see People v. Lyle, 613 P.2d 896, 899 (Colo. 1980). 
 181. See, e.g., McCracken v. State, 914 P.2d 893 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) 
(explaining that a defendant who admits to assault but claims self-defense is 
entitled to introduce evidence establishing his awareness of specific violent acts 
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prosecutor objects that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the 
defendant was “really” subjectively aware of the prior assaultive event 
before the charged assault? What if the prosecution objects that the 
defendant’s claim is fabricated and claims that the defendant only 
learned of his opponent’s prior violent acts from reading police reports 
provided in discovery after he was charged? 
While no Alaska case squarely answers these questions, Rule 104(b) 
does provide some guidance. The issue is a classic example of 
conditional relevance. If the defendant was aware of the past act before 
the charged assault, his testimony on the point is admissible. If he was 
not aware of the act, then it is irrelevant. Thus, whether the defendant 
knew of a prior specific violent act beforehand is a factual controversy, 
which the defendant is entitled to have resolved by the jury. 
Rule 104(b) governs the court’s ruling. If the defense attorney can 
present evidence “sufficient to support a finding” that the defendant 
was aware of the victim’s prior acts before the charged assault, the judge 
has a duty to submit the issue to the jury for its determination.182 
Perhaps surprisingly, only a single, unreported Alaska appellate 
decision addresses this issue, and then only obliquely.183 At least one 
sister state court has expressly held that Evidence Rule 104(b) governs 
this issue.184 
2.  Prior False Claim of Sexual Assault 
As we have seen, in the thirty years since the supreme court’s 
promulgation of Alaska’s evidence rules, Alaska courts have repeatedly 
held that admissibility of conditionally relevant evidence is governed by 
Rule 104(b). In one recent case, however, the Alaska Court of Appeals 
 
committed by decedent to prove reasonableness of his action); James Fayette, If 
You Knew Him Like I Did, You’d Have Shot Him Too…: A Survey of Alaska’s Law of 
Self-Defense, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 171, 219–22 (2008). 
 182. Smith v. State, No. A-7964, 2004 WL 719993, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 
31, 2004). 
 183. See Thompson v. State, No. A-3055, 1990 WL 10509491, at *3–5 (Alaska 
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 1990) (holding that the evidence that the defendant knew of a 
prior bad act by the victim, causing his fear, was “tenuous” and could thus be 
excluded as failing to satisfy Rule 104(b)). The Thompson opinion is interesting 
for two reasons. First, the Thompson court’s holding that the third-party report of 
the prior bad act was not “hearsay” because it was not offered for its truth 
foreshadowed, by six years, the McCracken holding. See id. at *4. Second, the 1990 
Thompson opinion was written by Superior Court Judge Elaine Andrews, seated 
as a court of appeals judge, pro temp. See id. at *1. Twelve years later, Judge 
Andrews presided over the Edwards homicide trial. See generally Trial Transcript, 
supra note 3. 
 184. Lyle, 613 P.2d at 899 (holding that the defendant offered sufficient direct 
and circumstantial evidence that he was aware of the decedent’s prior bad acts 
to satisfy Rule 104(b), triggering admission of the evidence to the jury). 
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departed from its own precedent and from Rule 104(b). As this section 
explains, that opinion, Morgan v. State,185 is inconsistent with the court of 
appeals’ own precedent and is arguably constitutionally infirm. 
In Covington v. State,186 the court of appeals held that a defendant 
charged with sexual assault may offer proof that the victim had made 
previous false accusations of sexual assault, despite the usual rule 
against impeachment by proof of a witness’s specific prior false 
statements.187 Seventeen years later, in Morgan, the court of appeals 
clarified Covington, holding that a prior specific false report of sexual 
assault was only admissible if the defendant could convince the trial judge 
by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the complaining witness made 
another accusation of sexual assault; (2) this accusation was factually 
untrue; and (3) the complaining witness knew that the accusation was 
untrue.188 
The Morgan court incorrectly declined to apply Rule 104(b) to what 
is clearly a disputed factual issue. If the prior report was “really” false, it 
should be deemed relevant and admissible under Covington. If the prior 
report was “really” true, then it is not relevant. Therefore, it should be 
the jury that determines whether the prior claim was true or false. There 
is no intellectually sound way to distinguish this factual dispute from 
the admissibility of a disputed defendant’s statement, disputed motive 
evidence, or the commission of prior relevant acts.189 The policy reasons 
that the Morgan court claims support its result are unpersuasive. The 
Morgan court stated: 
[I]f we were to adopt the “some evidence” test used in 
Louisiana and Wisconsin, a test which merely requires 
sufficient evidence to put the matter in doubt, then we would 
be encouraging trials within trials, and we would also throw 
open the doors to debates about a complaining witness’s sexual 
history based on dubious evidence. 190 
 
 185. 54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 186. 703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 187. Id. at 441–42. The Covington court held that false report evidence was 
admissible if, as a foundational matter, the defendant established the falsity of 
the prior accusations “as, for example, where the charges somehow had been 
disproved or where the witness had conceded their falsity . . . .” Id. 
 188. Morgan, 54 P.3d at 333; see also Copeland v. State, 70 P.3d 1118, 1124 
(Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the testimony of a man previously accused 
of sexual assault by the victim was inadmissible because there was insufficient 
evidence to support his story). 
 189. Thus, Morgan is squarely at odds with Marino, Thompson, Bennett, 
Ayagarak, McCormack, and Smith. 
 190. Morgan, 54 P.3d at 339. 
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But as Alaska’s evidence rules recognize, and as we have seen, 
resolution of factual disputes is the proper province of the jury.191 
Litigation of the truth or falsity of a discrete, prior false accusation may 
be time-consuming, but it represents time well-spent for a defendant 
facing the prospect of decades of incarceration. It is no more time-
consuming than litigating disputes about the defendant’s true motive, 
his prior statements, or his commission of past relevant acts—all of 
which the court of appeals has analyzed under Rule 104(b).192 
Alaska’s trial judges retain broad discretion to place reasonable 
limits on the presentation of cumulative or distracting evidence and may 
even limit the proponent to a pre-approved list of leading questions.193 
Thus, the Morgan court’s fears about “trials within trials” are unsound. 
Finally, evidence of a prior false report of a sexual assault does not run 
afoul of the rape shield statute, because that statute is limited to 
evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct.194 A false report of a sexual 
assault is not evidence of sexual conduct; rather, it is evidence of a 
specific false allegation of sexual conduct.195 
Constitutionally, Morgan is open to criticism, because it creates the 
possibility that a defendant may be denied the opportunity to prove that 
his accuser lied in the past where he offers “reasonably debatable” proof 
that the jury might credit, but which fails to subjectively convince the judge. 
Viewed in this light, Morgan is inconsistent with the defendant’s right to 
 
 191. As Judge Coats acknowledged in his Morgan concurring opinion, 
“whether [the witnesses supporting Morgan’s claim that his accuser made false 
allegations] were credible or not is the kind of question that fact finders deal 
with on a regular basis.” Id. at 341. 
 192. Courts examined the following cases under ALASKA R. EVID. 104(b): 
Smith, McCormack (motive), Marino (statements), and Ayagarak (past relevant 
acts). 
 193. See ALASKA R. EVID. 611(a)(2)–(3); Heaps v. State, 30 P.3d 109 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 194.  Admissibility of testimony about a victim’s “previous sexual conduct” is 
governed by Alaska’s rape shield statute. ALASKA STAT. §12.45.045(a) (2008). 
 195. The statute requires a judicial finding of relevance prior to admission of 
such evidence. Id. Alaska law bars prior sexual conduct evidence when the 
“relevance” of this evidence rests on the impermissible inference that the victim 
is likely to have freely engaged in sexual relations with the defendant because 
the victim had freely engaged in sexual relations with other people. Napoka v. 
State, 996 P.2d 106, 108 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); see also State v. DeSantis, 456 
N.W.2d 600, 605 n.4 (Wis. 1990) (collecting cases which hold that rape shield 
statutes do not bar evidence of a prior untruthful accusation, because the 
proponent usually seeks to prove that the claim was false). 
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have a jury decide disputed facts,196 and with his right to present a 
defense.197 
Morgan is all the more curious because it seemingly stands at odds 
with a decision reached by the court of appeals just two years earlier. In 
Weaver v. State,198 the defendant was charged with sexual abuse of a 
teenage girl.199 He sought to prove that the victim fabricated the 
allegation, arguing that the victim had become sexually active with 
other partners prior to his indictment.200 He theorized that the victim 
fabricated the allegation to engender sympathy because she was afraid 
her parents would discover her sexual activity.201 The trial judge 
excluded testimony about the victim’s prior sexual conduct.202 The court 
of appeals noted that the testimony was not barred by the rape shield 
statute, because Weaver did not seek to prove the victim’s general 
promiscuity.203 They also found that the trial judge erred in part, because 
he based his ruling on a specific finding regarding the chronology of the 
prior sexual conduct.204 Because testimony on this point was disputed, it 
was erroneous for the judge to resolve this issue. Judge Mannheimer 
explained: 
One aspect of Judge Card’s ruling appears to be mistaken. As 
explained above, most of the witnesses testified that Veronica 
became sexually active in May 1997, but one witness testified 
that she became sexually active in January 1997. Judge Card 
credited the majority of the witnesses and ruled that Veronica 
had become sexually active in May. The judge should not have 
resolved this discrepancy. When a party seeks to introduce 
evidence, and the relevancy of that evidence turns on the 
resolution of a subsidiary question of fact, a trial judge should 
 
 196. See Folger v. State, 648 P.2d 111, 113–14 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (holding 
that even weak and doubtful self-defense claims are to be resolved by the jury). 
 197. See Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 591 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Keith v. 
State, 612 P.2d 977, 984 (Alaska 1980) (“Defendants are ‘entitled to present [their] 
version of the events and the evidence supporting it in as full a manner as 
possible.’”)); see also Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 233 (1988) (restricting 
cross-examination of victim in a sexual assault case regarding her cohabitation 
with a third party deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront adverse witnesses); United States v. Platero, 72 F.3d 806, 814–16 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (excluding evidence, in sexual assault case, about the alleged victim’s 
romantic or sexual relationship with a third party violated the defendant’s 
confrontation rights). 
 198. No. A-7081, 4271, 2000 WL 1287937 (Alaska Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2000). 
 199.  Id. at *1. 
 200. Id. at *2. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *3. 
 203. Id. 
 204.  Id. at *4. 
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admit the offered evidence “upon, or subject to, the 
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding” in the 
moving party’s favor on this subsidiary question of fact. Thus, 
if the relevance of Veronica’s sexual activity had hinged on 
whether that activity occurred in May 1997 or in January 1997, 
then Judge Card should have admitted the evidence—because 
Weaver presented a foundational witness who testified that 
Veronica’s sexual activity occurred in January.205 
Ultimately, while acknowledging that the trial judge violated Rule 
104(b) by deciding a disputed factual issue, the Weaver court affirmed 
the trial judge’s exclusion of the defense evidence under Rule 403—
finding that testimony about the victim’s prior sexual conduct was likely 
to be confusing and unfairly prejudicial to the prosecution.206 The Weaver 
court reaffirmed, in dicta, that reasonably debatable disputed factual 
issues are properly submitted to the jury under Rule 104(b).207 Yet, two 
years later, the Morgan court reached the opposite conclusion: that 
defense claims of a specific past false allegation—a disputed factual 
event—was not subject to Rule 104(b) analysis. However, the allegation 
was subject to the trial judge’s ruling that falsity was established by a 
preponderance—a procedure essentially identical to Rule 104(a).208 
Therefore, it is very difficult to reconcile Weaver with Morgan—and 
equally difficult to reconcile Morgan, which affirmed exclusion of 
exculpatory defense evidence, with the post-2003 Alaska Rule 104(b) 
cases that affirmed admission of disputed, inculpatory prosecution 
evidence. When one compares the Morgan holding with the post-2003 
Alaska cases discussed in this Article, the best one can say is that Morgan 
is intellectually inconsistent.209 
 
 205. Id. (citation omitted). Judge Card’s error resonates with United States v. 
Koontz, 143 F.3d 408, 411–12 (8th Cir. 1998) (the ruling was error where the trial 
judge admitted a disputed jail booking report based upon his subjective belief 
that the subject of a disputed jail booking report and a defense trial witness were 
“the same person”; the issue was one for the jury, not the judge). 
 206. Id. at *5. 
 207.  Id. at *4. 
 208. In fact, the Morgan court drew a direct comparison to admissibility of co-
conspirator statements, which is governed by Rule 104(a). Morgan v. State, 54 
P.3d 332, 339 n.36 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (citing Arnold v. State, 751 P.2d 494, 
502 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988)); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) 
(Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) governs preliminary findings regarding the 
existence and duration of a conspiracy and admissibility of co-conspirator 
statements). 
 209. Morgan also raises a technically intriguing ambiguity. We know from 
Bourjaily and Rule 104(a) itself that the judge is not bound by the rules of 
evidence when ruling on preliminary matters. Thus, the judge may consider 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay when deciding whether the accused belonged to 
a conspiracy and the duration of a conspiracy. Therefore, if a Morgan 
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CONCLUSION 
Mark Edwards was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder 
for killing Mona Edwards and Maela Crabtree.210 Edwards died in jail in 
2004.211 Because Edwards died with a pending appeal, his appeal was 
mooted, and his convictions were posthumously vacated.212 Therefore, 
Judge Andrews’ ruling regarding admissibility of Mona’s letter escaped 
appellate review. 
But, as we have seen in this Article, in the years since Edwards’ 
2002 trial, the Alaska Court of Appeals has decided five Rule 104(b) 
cases.213 In each case, the court affirmed admission of disputed 
prosecution evidence where the evidence was “reasonably debatable” 
and where the proponent offered “evidence sufficient to support” the 
jury’s finding that the event occurred. Twice, the court relied upon Rule 
104(b) to affirm admission of disputed prosecution motive evidence—
which was exactly the prosecution’s goal in the Edwards trial.214 With the 
benefit of perfect hindsight, one can now see that Judge Andrews’ 2002 
ruling was correct. It is equally clear that had Mark Edwards lived, he 
would have seen Judge Andrews’ ruling regarding the admissibility of 
Maela’s letter and his conviction affirmed. 
To busy criminal law practitioners, the law of conditional relevance 
is a seemingly obscure evidentiary nuance. However, as we have seen, 
Rule 104(b) haunts criminal trial fact patterns with startling frequency. 
The rule comes into play whenever factual disputes arise regarding 
 
preliminary hearing is essentially governed by Rule 104(a), as the court implied, 
is the defendant bound by the rules of evidence at this hearing? Rule 104(a) and 
Bourjaily would support an argument that the court is not bound by the rules of 
evidence at such a preliminary hearing. If this is true, then could the defendant 
offer rank hearsay to the judge at the preliminary hearing regarding the falsity of 
the victim’s prior claim? Or could the prosecutor offer rank hearsay establishing 
that the prior claim was true? Unfortunately, the Morgan opinion does not reach 
this point. 
 210.  Edwards v. State, No. A-8507 (Alaska Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (statement 
of points on appeal) (on file with the Alaska Law Review). 
 211.  Sheila Toomey, Man Who Killed Wife, Her Roommate Dies in Prison, 
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 8, 2004. 
 212. If a defendant in a criminal case dies while his appeal is pending, the 
judgment against the defendant is vacated and the charges against him are 
abated ab initio. Hartwell v. State, 423 P.2d 282, 284 (Alaska 1967). For an 
interesting discussion of this issue, see McCurdy v. State, No. A-08816, 2006 WL 
2390260, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2006). 
 213. See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 205 P.3d 1113 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009); 
Thompson v. State, 210 P.3d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009); McCormack v. State, 
No. A-9870, 2008 WL 5352364 (Alaska Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2008); Smith v. State, No. 
1912, 2004 WL 719993 (Alaska Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2004); Ayagarak v. State, No. A-
8066, 2003 WL 1922623 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2003). 
 214. McCormack, 2008 WL 5352364 at *3–4; Smith, 2004 WL 719993, at *4. 
FAYETTE BUSALACCHI_CPCXNS.DOC 12/11/2009  3:17:07 PM 
2009 CONDITIONAL RELEVANCE 211 
“other relevant acts” testimony, proof of motive, disputed statements, 
and audio recording or photographic authenticity. For these reasons, 
prosecutors in particular should be very familiar with the principles 
explained in this Article. 
While most frequently prosecutors will make use of this principle, 
as we have seen, defense attorneys can, and should, invoke the same 
rule in appropriate circumstances. The Authors hope this discussion will 
be of use to the bench and the Bar when such issues arise again in the 
future. 
